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JAROSLAV CUHRA
IN THE SHADOW OF LIBERALIZATION
Repressions in Czechoslovakia in the 1960s
Jenom si nedejte namluvit,
Âe mor ve m st  ustal. 
Vid l jsem sám jeÒt  mnoho rakví 
vjíÂd t do brány,
která tam nebyla jediná.1
…
Jaroslav Seifert, Morový sloup
The fundamental shape of history in postwar Czechoslovakia was determined by
that of the so-called Eastern bloc as a whole. Even so, within the outer Soviet
empire we find, alongside all the common elements and tendencies, a number of
independent story lines originating either in the actions of the local communist
regimes, or from movement within society itself, or specific national or civic
traditions. In short, the Soviet domination of its Eastern European satellites had its
limits. While there is some justification for contemptuously dismissing the local
communist rulers as mere “puppets,” nevertheless there was a certain amount of
room for autonomous policies, in both the positive and negative sense of the word:
for example, Kádár’s policy of “goulash Socialism” or, at the opposite end of the
spectrum, the “phoney” liberalization in Czechoslovakia. The Khrushchev decade
is one of the least researched stages of modern Czechoslovak history; in examining
it, we run up against the limitations of the prevailing historical interpretation.2
This interpretation has been influenced by the idea that the 1960s culminated in the
events of the Prague Spring, an unsuccessful attempt to create a new model of
1. Just don’t let them tell you / that the plague in the village is over./ I saw a lot of coffins coming
in / riding through the gate / and that’s not the only gate./... Jaroslav Seifert: Plague Column.
2. For more on the Czechoslovak historiography dealing with the postwar period, see Jaroslav
Cuhra, Michal Kope©ek: « L’Historiographie tchèque du communisme depuis 1989 », La





socialism, “Socialism with a human face.” Such an interpretation accents currents and
tendencies that in hindsight came to play a role in 1968, resulting in the picture of a duel
between the reform Communists (plus a part of the younger generation and artistic
community) on one side, the conservative wing of the Communist Party of
Czechoslovakia (KS¢) and their allies on the other. Other strata of society are
neglected; the non-Party public comes in for criticism for their alleged passivity in the
“struggle” of “progressive circles” to remove the “remnants of Stalinism.” This
interpretation pattern came into being immediately after the suppression of the Prague
Spring among historians and writers expelled from the Communist Party after 1968,
and played a particularly important role in the Czechoslovak exile press and foreign
publications.3 After 1989 it was accepted by the domestic historian community and
became part of the “textbook version” of history.4 Although recent research has tended
to mitigate such pointed interpretations,5 we have yet to see a focused examination of
the “narratives” within social segments outside the previously emphasized groups.6
The following study attempts to illustrate such a need by focusing on instances
of repression and political violence in Czechoslovakia from the death of Stalin to
the mid-1960s. Such a narrowly defined topic is of course as narrow as the above
interpretation stressing almost exclusively the role of the reform circles. The reader
should be aware that this is really just another aspect, intended to highlight
previously neglected trends and events. The author is, of course, aware that people
also “lived and got married” then, and that their life at the time revolved around
other things than just political repression and show trials.7 On the other hand, it
should also be perceived that direct judicial persecution was only the last mode of
repression employed by the communist regime. Social persecution of all kinds and
preventive police action (i.e. warning and threats) formed an inherent part of the
period’s atmosphere. However, these are beyond the scope of this study.
Czechoslovakia’s entry into the post-Stalin era was marked by the following
events: Stalin’s death was followed a few days later by that of KS¢ Chairman and
3. See‚ for example‚ works by Zden k Mlyná , Ji í Pelikán, and Zden k Hejzlar.
4. See the newest interpretation set forth by Jan K en, leading Czech historian and member of
the liberal wing of the Party at that time, who asserts that “A significant portion of society, if not
the majority, remained on the sidelines during this process, and observed this process and
liberalization as such with sympathetic detachment at best.” Jan K en, Dv  století st ední
Evropy [Two centuries of Central Europe] (Praha: Argo, 2005), 753.
5. Karel Kaplan’s unfinished work Ko eny ©eskoslovenské reformy [The Roots of the
Czechoslovak Reform] (Brno: Dopln k) is fundamental in this respect. Its first two volumes
were published in 2000 and 2002, the third volume is expected this year. The work is based on
deep knowledge of the archives, and describes various aspects of the social development, from
foreign policy and economy to expressions of civic dissatisfaction. For a reinterpretation of the
1960s see also FrantiÒek Koudelka, Státní bezpe©nost 1954-1968 [State Security 1954-1968],
(Praha: ÚSD AV ¢R, 1993). 
6. Some attempts have been made, e.g. Vojt ch Vl©ek, Perzekuce muÂsk ch ád  a
kongregací komunistick m reÂimem 1948-1964 [The Communist Persecution of Male Orders
and Congregations, 1948-1964] (Olomouc: Matice cyrilometod jská, 2003); Jaroslav Cuhra,
P íb h procesu s “ilegální k est’anskodemokratickou stranou” v roce 1961 [The Story of the
“Illegal Christian Democratic Party” Trial in 1961] (Praha: ÚSD AV ¢R, 1997).
7. This study made use of the newly accessible State Security files in the Archives of the
Ministry of Interior in Prague. 
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President of the Czechoslovak Republic Klement Gottwald, then the undisputed
top authority among local Communist functionaries. The search for a successor was
a tense one, in an atmosphere of growing economic crisis caused by the
unscrupulous rush to build up the country’s heavy (military) industry. A
compromise was finally reached, which met Soviet demands that the new
leadership be a collective one. The function of party chairman was eliminated and
quietly replaced by the newly created function of First Secretary of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (ÚV KS¢), to be filled by
the heretofore relatively unknown Antonín Novotn . Antonín Zápotock  became
President, and Viliam ∑irok  prime minister. The object of this reorganization was
to solidify the principle of control of the state apparatus by the Communist Party:
the key posts would be occupied by members of the ÚV KS¢ Presidium. This new-
wine-in-an-old-bottle regime faced a difficult task: how to respond to the current
economic difficulties and expressions of popular dissatisfaction which included
public demonstrations.8 The solution they found was a monetary reform, already in
the works, introduced in order to devalue the population’s growing monetary
savings. The regime, unable to supply consumer goods on which these savings
could be spent, instead launched a propaganda attack on the “class enemy,” which
“logically” meant the ones with excess buying power. The exchange for the new
money was severely disadvantageous. Only a limited amount could be exchanged
at the somewhat reasonable rate of 5:1 (i.e., one new crown for five old ones); any
amount above that had to be exchanged at 50:1. This meant a “profit” of 14 billion
crowns for the state treasury. The confiscation of its citizens’ wealth allowed the
state to retire its existing debt and created the financial conditions for spending
programs that would tie selected elements of society closer to the regime. In the
long term it was a strategically decisive step, with clear advantages to the regime
despite a prompt outburst of popular wrath. On the date the monetary exchange
took effect (1 June 1953), demonstrations and strikes broke out in more than 130
places, the strongest being in working-class Plze . The town was actually taken
over for a short time by the demonstrators, but military units and the communist
People’s Militia soon restored order. Throughout the country at least 800 people
were arrested, and about 300 of them were sentenced to prison, some for years. It
was one of the first demonstrations against the communist regime in Eastern
Europe; even so, it was a minor incident in comparison with the explosions of
resistance in the GDR, or the later Polish and Hungarian revolts. Unrest remained
more or less isolated; the demonstrations were quelled by the police, and at no point
did the regime lose the ability to monitor and react to events.
8. In particular the demonstrations around the anniversary of the birth of first Czechoslovak
President TomáÒ Garrigue Masaryk (7 March 1850, died 1937), whose popularity as “the
President-Liberator” was still very high despite communist denunciations. Attempts to destroy
his statue in Prost jov in April 1953 led to direct clashes between the population and the police.
See Ji í Pernes, Snahy o p ekonání politicko–hospodá ské krize v ¢eskoslovensku v roce








Just a few weeks later top Czechoslovak officials visited Moscow. Like their
East German and Hungarian counterparts, they were told of the need for a “new
course” to raise living standards and to halt the radical collectivization of
agriculture. It seems9 that the Czechoslovak group was spared the kind of severe
criticism that was directed at the Hungarians. At the risk of oversimplification, it
was at this very point, still before the 20th Congress of the CPSU, that the
Czechoslovak approach to the post-Stalin re-evaluation began to diverge from that
of its Polish and Hungarian neighbours. The events in Hungary were decisively
affected by the rise of Imre Nagy to government; while in the Polish case Gomulka
became, at least unofficially, the great hope of the “reformists.” The case of
Czechoslovakia followed an entirely different scenario. In the regime’s
propaganda, former ÚV KS¢ General Secretary Rudolf Slánsk , who was
executed along with ten other high Party officials in 1952, turned from a mere agent
of Zionism and imperialism into the Czech Beriia, but his guilt and the correctness
of his execution were not to be questioned. And while the Communists imprisoned
and detained in neighbouring countries were being released, in Czechoslovakia the
great purges in the Party cadres continued much as before. Especially interesting in
this regard was the trial of Gustáv Husák and other Slovak politicians, who were
accused of “bourgeois nationalism” and convicted in April 1954; nor was this the
only trial of important Party members.10 It was significant that the Party leadership,
aware of its compromising ties to the past, strove to present a united front. There
was little advantage that any of the power factions could have in coming out with a
critique of Stalinist repression and show trials; or, in other words, none of the major
functionaries could play that card to advance their personal careers or viewpoints.
The difference between Czechoslovakia and its “people’s democratic”
neighbours becomes especially clear when comparing the rate of political repression
and the question of rehabilitation of noncommunist victims of persecution. The
Polish and Hungarian societies were immediately confronted (before the CPSU’s
20th Congress) with at least fragmentary information; they had the opportunity to
come into contact with victims of these trials, now released; information trickled
down to the public about the real “work” of the secret police; and citizens carried off
to the Soviet Union were now allowed to return.11 Nothing like that was happening
in Czechoslovakia. No amnesty for political prisoners, however partial, was
forthcoming. In 1955, a small number of prisoners were released, but practically
none of the noncommunist victims. The most these could hope for was a symbolic
9. The minutes of this meeting are missing from the Czech archives; they can only be
reconstructed from the subsequent steps taken and the working materials. 
10. Husák was sentenced to life in prison, four others to terms ranging from 10 to 22 years.
11. For example: the description of the methods of the Polish secret police after the emigration
of one of its high functionaries Józef ∑wiatlo, whose account was broadcast by Radio Free
Europe in September 1954; the broad amnesties for political prisoners in Poland and Hungary
in 1954-55, and the decisive withdrawal of previously loyal intellectuals from the existing
political system (in the words of Hungarian poet László Benjámin: “I am guilty, I believed in a
crime”). By that time both regimes had lost their complete control over public discourse. 
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shortening of their sentences. On the contrary, the reluctance of the Party leadership
and the State Security (StB) to upset the established order of things was reflected in
the continuation of repressive policies, even if they were increasingly shy about
publicizing such cases. The absurdity of this approach is shown by the attitude of the
state toward its own citizens carried off and imprisoned in the Soviet Union and now
being released from the Gulag: they immediately became the targets of the StB, and
were prevented from fully reintegrating into community life. Recent research has
shown cases of returnees who, after being “rehabilitated” by the Soviets, were
arrested immediately upon arrival in their home country and convicted again for the
same “antistate” activities they had already served time for.12 The political show
trials continued to be understood as a tool for policy promotion. As the general
prosecutor said in May 1953 in his instructions for organizing public trials, “it’s still
important that we, in punishing criminal acts, [...] fulfil our educational mission in
relation to the working people” and assist in “the education of the population in the
spirit of Socialism.”13 The statistics show that it took a very long time for the
repression to wind down. Of the nearly 10,000 persons sentenced in 1955 for
criminal acts of a political nature, more than 1,200 were punished under laws
allowing sentences longer than five years in prison. The next year, nearly
8,000 people were condemned in political trials, and in the following three years
there were 21,000 victims of judicial persecution.14 According to official statistics,
10,779 political prisoners were in Czechoslovak jails as of January 1, 195715; six
months earlier the KS¢ leadership had been informed that the prisons contained 433
bishops, priests, and students of theology.
The severity of the KS¢’s reaction to the slightest sign of spontaneous activity is
evident in the renewed hard-line approach to the collectivization of agriculture.
After a mass exodus from the cooperative farms, President Zápotock ’s declaration
that the government and the KS¢ would no longer force farmers to join the
cooperatives, nor prevent anyone from leaving, was quickly reversed. In the spring
of 1954 the Minister of Justice noted with concern that the trials of “rich villagers”
had stopped, and in early 1955 the KS¢ authorities criticized the approach of the
security and justice departments as being too lenient. A new stage of forced
collectivization was introduced, though the most extreme methods were quietly
abandoned. The struggle against religion was revived in a similar manner. Openly
12. See for example Petr ¢uka: « Únosy lidí z ¢eskoslovenska sov tskou KGB » [Kidnappings
of People from Czechoslovakia by the Soviet KGB], Securitas imperii, 7 (2001): 192-223. 
13. National Archive, Prague (NA), fond ÚV KS¢ — právní komise ÚV KS¢, a.j. 113,
Instrukce k procesům s organisovanou ve ejností, Praha 19.5. 1953.
14. The figures are derived from the rehabilitations carried out after the fall of the communist
regime. In view of the method of blanket rehabilitation on the basis of entire passages of criminal
law, the numbers are more or less orientational; they include both suspended and unconditional
sentences and provide no information about the length or concurrence of sentences. See
FrantiÒek Gebauer, Karel Kaplan, FrantiÒek Koudelka, Rudolf Vyhnálek, Soudní perzekuce
politické povahy v ¢eskoslovensku 1948-1989 [Politically Motivated Persecution: Statistical
Data] (Praha: ÚSD AV ¢R, 1993).





violent public repression was toned down, but the criticism of religion and faith was
intensified. If the Stalinist period was characterized by a “struggle” against the
Catholic Church under the pretext of its “antinational” and “antistate” character,
now the agenda was expanded to the promotion of atheism and eradication of faith
in God as such. The rhetoric of the struggle against religion was also reflected in the
verdicts against members of the clergy (mostly the Catholic Church), where
religious activity itself was clearly the true offence. This was not a deviation from
some liberalized, post-Stalinist norm, but rather a rule: after all, nearly two thirds of
the known trials of members of the religious orders took place until 1955!16 The
severe measures taken against an alleged attempt to revive the Social Democratic
Party and the “treasonous” activities of its former officials climaxed in a series of
trials in 1954-55, demonstrating that any expression of doubt about the communist
monopoly on decision-making would be severely punished. 
To summarize the first three post-Stalin years in Czechoslovakia, it is clear that
the political atmosphere was not conducive to social currents of the kind that had
galvanized neighbouring Hungary and Poland. And the fault did not lie with a
passive citizenry alone. A phenomenon such as the Petöfi Circle in Hungary would
have been unthinkable without some relaxation on the police‘s part, or a certain
amount of open or concealed disunity in the Party leadership. 
The 20th Congress of the CPSU put the Czechoslovak party leadership in a
situation characterized by President Zápotock , referring to criticism of the cult of
personality, as follows: “Do you want us to rub it in? [...] The right policy is not to
meddle in these things.”17 In Czechoslovakia, Khrushchev’s speech did not become
a “public issue” as it did in Poland, nor did it provide a pretext to introduce the
question of rehabilitation and re-evaluation of past “excesses.” Its social impact
was more or less restricted to limited circles such as Party assemblies, which
confined themselves to demanding more detailed explanations of unclear
interpretations, and holding an extraordinary congress. Only a couple of events had
any broader public impact, but it is tempting to overrate even these events, as both
were of a basically isolated nature. The Second Czechoslovak Writers’ Congress
produced some previously unheard-of calls to de-muzzle the silenced and
imprisoned artists and protect the artistic community from political manipulation;
however, a threat coming from the authorities was enough to force the Writers’
Union to distance itself from these “demagogic demands.”18 On the other hand, that
year’s traditional student “Majáles” (rag day) procession, held a month later, had a
16. See Jaroslav Cuhra, “Církevní procesy [Clerical Trials]”, in Ji í Pernes and Jan Foitzik eds.,
Politické procesy v ¢eskoslovensku po roce 1945 a „p ípad Slánsk “ [Political Trials in
Czechoslovakia After 1945 and the “Slánsk  Case”], (Brno: ÚSD AV ¢R, 2005), 147-157.
17. Karel Kaplan, ¢eskoslovensko v letech 1953-1966 [Czechoslovakia in 1953-1966] (Praha:
SPN, 1992), 37.
18. Much talked about were the speeches of later Nobel Prize winner Jaroslav Seifert, and of
writers Katarína Lazarová, FrantiÒek Hrubín, and Dominik Tatarka. The regime was so irritated
by this effrontery that even three years later the writers’ conference was required to discuss
these “negative” tendencies and to condemn them in its resolution. By that time the poet Hrubín
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clearly formulated “program” of resolutions adopted at faculty meetings, but no
real effort was made to push them through. It was enough to ignore the demands
and conduct selective measures against the more active ones by expelling them
from school.19 That was more or less the extent of the Czechoslovak contribution to
the revolutionary year 1956, aside from a few severely suppressed protests by
political prisoners. 
The memory of 1956 was undoubtedly coloured by the Czechoslovak passivity
in contrast to the revolts in neighbouring countries. Criticizing the Czechoslovak
society may be justified, but for reasons described above, the chances of
successfully speaking out against the regime were much more limited. Two more
minor details for illustration. Although the students were probably spared arrest for
their statements and demands, similar restraint was not observed regarding other
segments of society, especially persons of “wrong origin” such as Colonel Jaroslav
Hájí©ek, who fought against Nazism in the ranks of the Czechoslovak army in the
West.20 Because he had been imprisoned and interned for several years in the early
1950s, his “cadre profile” begged for severe measures. For merely distributing
excerpts of the students’ appeals and resolutions, he was arrested along with his
accomplices in June 1956 and sentenced to three years in prison. His case is typical
of the broader measures applied by the organs of repression toward the slightest
indication of nonconformist or opposition activity during the supposedly “most
liberal” months of 1956 — provided such measures could be taken without
attracting too much public attention. Similar cases found in the StB materials have
been cited productively by French researcher Muriel Blaive in her work
Promarn ná p ileÂitost [The Lost Opportunity]. However, her conclusion is that the
nature of these — verbal and other — expressions of dissatisfaction with the
domestic situation and of sympathy with Hungary and Poland, was characteristic of
the general atmosphere in society, i.e., that the relative scarcity of such occurrences
reflected the society’s lack of interest in fundamental changes of the system.21 But
there is yet another interpretation. The way in which the StB registered and pursued
such fringe voices (including immediate imprisonment) is clear evidence that the
regime’s attitude towards the population was completely different from that of the
neighbouring countries. If mere “pub talk” about Poland and social dissatisfaction
meant immediate repression, it would have been hard to imagine the emergence of
the kind of prerevolutionary atmosphere then prevalent in Poland or Hungary. In
19. At least one student trial, however, was held at the end of 1956, when a group of students at
the University of Chemical Technology in Pardubice was convicted of group listening to
foreign radio, with sentences ranging from eight months to three years. See Antonín
Kratochvíl, Åaluji [I Blame] ,vol. 3 (Praha: Dolmen, 1990), 36-53.
20. The communist policy divided up the wartime resistance veterans ruthlessly. The soldiers
who fought in units alongside the Anglo-American forces ended up in prisons and camps, while
East front warriors had better chances for a comfortable life, as long as they kept their
knowledge of Soviet reality to themselves.
21. Muriel Blaive, Promarn ná p íleÂitost: ¢eskoslovensko a rok 1956 [The Lost Opportunity:




Czechoslovakia, the hard-line course — so far away from an idea of “thaw” — was
to continue. 
By October and November 1956 any kind of liberalization had become
unthinkable. As Antonín Novotn  put it, “[...] We need to be tough even now; if we
let up, comrades, I don’t know what kind of consequences we’d face.”22 The Party
rank and file, frightened by the propaganda image of “raging counterrevolution” in
Budapest, paid heed. Although there is no doubt that the events of that year were the
first breaking point for many future reform Communists, the immediate reaction
was to tighten the screws even more.
The atmosphere was clearly reflected in the result of the first attempt at re-
examination of the show trials, reluctantly opened in January 1955.23 The final
report, which was discussed by the KS¢ leadership in October 1957, was a
mockery of justice. Out of nearly 7,000 pleas for review of sentence, only 50 of the
sentences were acknowledged as unjustified, and 213 sentences as
“disproportionately high”. Most of these were the cases of Communist
functionaries who were quietly released anyway. By all appearances, the re-
examination was closed until 1962, as confirmed by the grudging confessions of
“just a few” StB agents who admitted using “illegal methods” of investigation.
After a long hesitation and resistance by Interior Ministry authorities, two
interrogators (Bohumil Doubek and Vladimír Kohoutek) were sentenced to prison
time, only to be released three months later (in December). In the years 1953-61,
only 21 (!) members of the StB were dismissed for violating the law, even though
the Doubek report listed another 64 people that had used the same methods of
interrogation.24 The StB fought off the threat of independent interference in its
investigations by defeating a proposal made by the judiciary to restore the
institution of investigating judge. Thus the StB continued to have absolute power
over detainees, and an independent oversight remained a mere illusion. In this
regard the Minister of Justice bitterly criticized similar legal considerations that, in
his opinion, incorrectly interpreted the term “observance of the law” to mean
“increasing the protection of citizens against state authorities, and not the
protection of the state.”25 The StB had no doubts about the legitimacy of continued
22. Karel Kaplan, Nekrvavá revoluce [The Bloodless Revolution] (Praha: Mladá fronta, 1993),
377. (The Short March, London: Hurst, 1987).
23. Paradoxically, the review committee consisted of persons responsible for a whole series of
trials, led by Interior Minister Rudolf Barák, who supervised the trials from 1953 on (including
the trial of Gustáv Husák). 
24. At the order of Rudolf Barák, none of them were even disciplined professionally. Historian
Karel Kaplan has edited the records of extensive reports by investigator Doubek on StB
interrogation methods, use of physical violence and provocations. See Karel Kaplan, StB o
sob : V pov d’ vyÒet ovatele Bohumila Doubka [The StB: A Report by Investigator Bohumil
Doubek] (Praha: ÚDV P¢R, 2002); Koudelka, Státní bezpe©nost…
25. Kaplan, ¢eskoslovensko v letech 1953-1966, 62; also: Ko eny ©eskoslovenské reformy:
IV. Struktury moci [The Roots of the Czechoslovak Reform: IV The Structures of Power]
(Brno: Dopln k, 2002), 294. He also declared that the term “investigating judge” is
unacceptable in itself because “it is linked to the principle of judicial independence” and “the
false cloak of independence for investigating judges was used by bourgeois justice.”
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political trials as a means of applying Party policy. This notion was reinforced by
various resolutions of the Party leadership. In January 1957 the KS¢ resolved to
redouble its efforts to stop foreign espionage, which sought its agents “among the
ranks of the class enemy,” but also among people “with Party membership cards.”
This was a reaction to the recently concluded trial of Josef Poto©ek and Václav
Kví©era, sentenced to death for cooperation with the British intelligence, during
which Poto©ek was accused of using his KS¢ membership to obtain secret
information.26 Nor did it stop with orders for the StB; all levels of Party
organization were to take up the task, for “... if one big Poto©ek was discovered at
the central level, then in the regions, districts, and so forth, a lot of little Poto©eks
can be at work.”27 A KS¢ politburo resolution of December 1957 on “political
class screening” touched off a massive new political purge of the state and Party
apparatus. The intention was not just to “unmask” politically unreliable
individuals who “work in the central authorities under the cover of their
professional qualification”; the goal was also to increase the number of officials of
working-class origin in the top functions. The millenarian conviction of the
previous decade had returned: not education, but class origin was the decisive
qualification for managing enterprises and institutions. The number of persons
affected by these purges has never been precisely determined, but it may have
been as many as 50,000 state employees. Reasons for action against them
included: “wrong origin,” “inappropriate” relatives, or previous membership in a
noncommunist political organization. Teachers formed a special category; they
were especially vetted for religious convictions. With the tacit agreement of top
KS¢ officials, affiliation with a church now disqualified a person for employment
in the field of education, although professional or other reasons were to be
emphasized.28 
The campaign against “liberalism” and “revisionism” also affected social groups
standing outside the central state bureaucracy. The February 1957 order by the
Politburo to apply strict class-based criteria for permission to study at secondary
schools and universities was another effort to revive the atmosphere of “intensified
class struggle.” The academic sector had long lost its “revolutionary enthusiasm”;
more and more young people were seeking their models outside the official culture.
Here the new measures could be only partially implemented. Contributing to this
was the passivity and indifference of the official Czechoslovak Union of Youth,
once an effective instrument for implementing communist directives in this area;
some of the teachers also played a mitigating role. Especially at the universities there
were plenty of voices criticizing current policies; thus the result of the crackdown
26. For an overview of the case see Zora Dvo áková, Z letopisů t etího odboje [From the
Chronicle of the “Third Resistance”] (Praha: H íbal, 1992), 232-239.
27. Koudelka, Státní bezpe©nost…, 24.
28. “Some [teachers] are still captive of idealistic opinions and religious prejudices. [Their
dismissal] was fundamentally correct... [but] religious conviction or membership in a church





was less clear-cut, and depended on the attitude of each school.29 Much more
decisive was the decision of the KS¢ to complete the destruction of the private
sector and the so-called middle class as the main pillar of the “old way of life.” This
was one of the preconditions for the planned “introduction of socialism,” and so the
decision was carried out in all seriousness. Administrative pressure and outright
violence were used especially against the self-employed (craftsmen, small retailers,
pub owners, truck owners, etc.) and private farmers. In April 1957, KS¢ officials
declared that, despite all efforts, the number of private business people had risen.
The relatively accurate information that the increase following the failure of state-
controlled enterprises to fulfil the demands of the population resulted in the decision
to entirely eliminate small businesses. It now became nearly impossible to register as
a self-employed person, and two years later this type of business activity was banned
altogether. Out of almost 40,000 self-employed people in 1957, there were only
some 2,000 left by the mid-1960s. This was achieved partially by simply revoking
business licenses; there was also a vindictive campaign by the Ministry of Interior
against former businessmen and the “persistent” self-employed, who were
supposedly retaining possession of “hidden” property and goods. There was a
propaganda campaign in the best Stalinist tradition to stoke resentment against
“former capitalists” by means of newspaper articles, radio and television programs
and exhibits of confiscated items that encouraged “denunciation of suspicious
persons”. No wonder that the “former capitalists” were now hearing “rumours”
about their impending liquidation — for, in the symbolic sense, this was the exact
intention.30 The theory of socialist production relations was obviously more
important than real-life evidence. As a result, the elimination of self-employment
merely pushed these activities into the “grey economy,” which went along with
misappropriation of state property by state employees. The same socialist theories
determined the fate of the last private farmers, despite the fact that more sober voices
warned that Czechoslovak agriculture was not ready for the shift to collective mass
production. The policy was clearly spelled out in a resolution of the KS¢ Congress
in June 1958: “To eliminate the remnants of the antagonistic classes, i.e., to
gradually achieve the liquidation of the kulaks as a class and the remaining self-
employed elements in urban areas by means of constant constriction and pressure.”31
At some stages the intense pressure on private farmers unleashed in 1955 nearly
matched that of the Stalin years. According to officially filed complaints (which of
course cannot be considered exhaustive), the methods included physical violence,
29. The degree to which the instructions were fulfilled varied. Some students were able to
formally interrupt studies, then return to complete their education after the Party lost interest.
On the other hand, there were examples of teachers who lost their jobs and were expelled from
the KS¢; there was also the case of Pardubice students, which predated the resolution; the fact
that school officials made no effort to defend them featured the attitude of that institution . 
30. See Koudelka, Státní bezpe©nost…, 92; NA, fond ÚV KS¢ — politické byro ÚV KS¢, sv.
217, a.j. 294, bod 6.
31. Karel Jech, Soumrak selského stavu 1945-1960 [Twilight of the Private Farmer in
Czechoslovakia, 1945-1960] (Praha: ÚSD AV ¢R, 2001), 173.
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illegal detention, harassment of the farmers’ relatives, and their economic liquidation
through requisition demands that were impossible to fulfil. The StB increased
pressure, cynically taking advantage of the worsening situation of small farms to
create fictional cases of sabotage and “antistate” activities. In the following years the
so-called “kulak-agrarian elements” made up a large proportion of the victims of
political trials. By no means were all of these people actually private farmers.
The“kulak” label was easily acquired, and difficult to escape; a vaguely defined
category that the KS¢ leadership was clear about (“the kulak has been and continues
to be the arch-enemy of all working people”) was now bestowed not only upon
original owners of bigger farmsteads and their children, but everyone farming over
15 ha of land. A kulak could commit a “crime” by farming as well as by entering a
cooperative: in 1958 the KS¢ leadership warned that “[...] nearly 20,000 kulaks have
gotten into the JZDs [agricultural cooperatives], and some have even infiltrated
cooperative management.”32 Logically, all failures in agriculture had their root cause
in kulak sabotage33, and the StB made sure of the conjectures’ plausibility. And it
congratulated itself in 1960: “Concentrated efforts to break down the kulak base and
the JZDs that have exhibited severe shortcomings in their economic results, have led
to the detection of intentional sabotage by kulaks and agrarians.”34 Even though
Czechoslovakia, thanks to the communists’ senseless policies, had not achieved
prewar levels of agricultural production even by 1960, the persecution could hardly
be halted. Unlike the situation in the neighbouring countries, the Czechoslovak plan
defined by the KS¢ in May 1958 as “the liquidation of the kulaks as a class” was
actually achieved. Out of 23,000 farms with more than 15 ha of land still operating
privately in 1954, there were only 6,000 left by 1958, and practically none in 1960.
What remained were tiny plots allotted to co-op members (most of less than 2 ha),
operating mainly in Slovakia; but the centuries-old face of the rural society was
destroyed forever. The malice behind the communist attitude toward cultural
traditions and history was fully revealed in the KS¢’s 1959 decision to raze
abandoned farmsteads and buildings connected to them, to tidy things up before the
15th anniversary of the liberation of Czechoslovakia.35 The disappearance of ancient
farmsteads and vacant buildings left behind by the expelled German-speaking
population, erased forever many of the elements that made up the country’s “stone
memory” — an incomprehensible act of barbarism.36
32. NA, A ÚV KS¢ — politbyro, sv. 178, a.j. 15.
33. “The resistance of the kulaks within the cooperatives is a frequent phenomenon today [...],
they sabotage the animal production sector, hinder the construction of communal social facilities
and animal housing, and steal the feed stocks.” NA, A ÚV KS¢ — politbyro, sv. 178, a.j. 15.
34. Archiv ministerstva vnitra (Archives of the Ministry of Interior, A MV ¢R), fond A 9, i.j. 79.
35. NA, A ÚV KS¢ — politbyro, sv. 236, a.j. 316.
36. The continuing “transfer” of Soviet agricultural practices into the Czechoslovak context, by no
way limited to the early 1950s, would require a study of its own. Khrushchev’s favorite Trofin
Denisovich Lysenko and his pseudo-scientific theories of agriculture were treated with all
seriousness, as was Khrushchev’s emphasis on maize. The baleful consequences of these
experiments were to be borne by the farmers, whose “sabotage” allegedly caused the failures. The
ludicrous theories of Soviet charlatans were still landing people in prison as late as the early 1960s. 
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The paranoid approach that sought out enemies by stressing the “class
perspective” reached its most extreme form with a directive issued by Interior
Minister Barák in January 1959, ordering that close watch be maintained on the so-
called “former persons” (an unfortunate term taken straight from Soviet
terminology) as individuals who together formed a “base for enemy activity.” This
was nothing new; the StB had long kept files on “inappropriate” citizens, monitored
them, etc., but this order brought the degree of surveillance to a height. For none
other than “class” reasons, more than 80,000 people in sixteen categories of
“former persons” were placed on file in the first year, and in 1961 the number of
monitored persons reached its peak at 97,943. Among them were alleged kulaks
and members of their families, members of churches and sects, of the “bourgeois”
anti-Nazi resistance, persons previously convicted of “antistate” activities, and
others. The order authorized active surveillance either by the StB and its agents, or
at least by the Public Security (uniformed police), as this category of citizens
(nearly 100,000 of them) was regarded as the international reaction’s last hope for
instigating unrest.37 Although the massive apparatus proved unable to completely
carry out the Minister’s order and, according to available data, it was able to
“monitor and control” only about half of the people on the list, it still is an
unbelievable figure. And in an atmosphere of intense scrutiny of this segment of the
population, the StB operatives undoubtedly saw these instructions as a basis for
direct action: “the detection and neutralization of the enemy activities of former
persons remains the main goal of our work.”38 The “former persons” seem to have
made up the vast majority of those investigated for criminal political activities in
the late 1950s and early1960s. From the StB‘s viewpoint, this was entirely logical
(“it can be considered a plus that former persons predominated among the realized
cases, and that their numbers are growing especially at this time”39). In this
perspective, the “former persons” “blinded by class hatred” were “poisoning the
air”40 just at the time when the entire country was preparing to formally enter
socialism.
Although the degree of judicial repression did not reach the heights of the Stalin
era, as mentioned above, it was still by no means negligible. Up to 1961 the number
of convictions on political charges ranged around 5,000 a year; more importantly,
in many cases the sentences were far more than symbolic. Even as late as in 1962,
there were more people sentenced for “serious” political crimes (carrying sentences
37. More on the “former persons” in Koudelka, Státní bezpe©nost…, 88-91.
38. A MV ¢R, A 9, i.j. 99.
39. A MV ¢R, A 9. i.j. 80, Zpráva o ©innosti Krajské správy MV ¢eské Bud jovice za rok 1960
[Report on the activities of the Regional Department of the Ministry of Interior in ¢eské
Bud jovice for the year 1960].
40. A MV ¢R, A 2/2, i.j. 1181; A 9, i.j. 26. It is interesting that even ministry officials were
aware of the illegality of this surveillance of the population; their concern was to conceal it. In
the words of Minister Barák: “Politically it would be incorrect if it were to leak out on us that
we are keeping files on people, even if they are the class enemy. We have to keep it within the
departments. […] another thing is to conceal it within the MV [Ministry of Interior], so that our
own departments don’t spread it around.” 
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of more than five years) than during the entire twenty-year period of the so-called
“normalization” after the Prague Spring (1969-1989), and a death penalty was
executed after a political trial. Between 1957 and 1962 a total of 3,144 people were
convicted of “serious” political crimes; of these, more than 800 were sentenced to
more than five years.41 We can only approximately define the social strata from
which the victims were recruited , but the basic contours are clear. The repression
conformed to Interior Ministry directives — the “enemy” must be actively
liquidated, especially the ranks of the clergy (“the class enemy, represented here by
the Vatican, has made its task to influence new groups of young people, disrupt the
work of youth organizations, and expand the base for the selection and further
education of anti-socialist cadres”); among members of the former political parties
(the People’s and Agrarian parties, “which are characterized by various attempts to
disrupt the process of socialization in the villages”); and last but not least among the
“bourgeois intelligentsia”. A major share of those persecuted were Christians (both
lay and clergy), especially Roman Catholics, officials of the former political parties
(the Agrarian and the People’s Party, and others), and people actively engaged in
youth work outside the official structures (within the proscribed Scouting
movement, for example). In Slovakia there were renewed attempts to discredit
Slovak ambitions for self-administration by accusing and trying people on the basis
of nationalism, in the spirit of earlier theories of “bourgeois nationalism.” The trials
for World War II war crimes were also exploited for political purposes, presented
by propaganda as a struggle against Slovak separatism and “Catholic clericalism.”
The so-called “amnestants,” i.e., the people who were released from prison at the
beginning of the 1960s, made up a special category that we will examine later.42
A brief glance at some of the cases and their concequences makes up an
impressive picture. Particularly the tough action against the churches was almost as
bad as it had been during the first years following 1948. It should be pointed out that
Czechoslovakia was no exception in this regard: in more or less all of the Soviet
satellites, most of the Khrushchev years were marked by direct repression of
religious groups. The Czechoslovak comrades were merely somewhat more eager
than their neighbouring counterparts. They did not hesitate to apply the severest
measures, led on both by their own ideological enthusiasm, and by unquestionable
41. See FrantiÒek Koudelka, Jana Váchová, Trestní postih pro trestné ©iny proti republice
v letech 1957-1968 v ¢eskoslovensku [Sentences for “Crimes Against the Republic” 1957-68
in Czechoslovakia] (Praha: ÚSD AV ¢R, 1993). 
42. On the trials of the late 1950s/early 1960s see Jaroslav Cuhra, P íb h procesu…; see also
“Politické procesy s v ícími za©átkem Òedesát ch let a p ípad ‘ilegální k est’anskodemokratické
strany’” [The Political Trials of Christians in the Early 1960s, and the Case of the “Illegal Christian
Democratic Party”], in Jan St íbrn , Církevní procesy padesát ch let (Kostelní Vyd í:
Karmelitánské nakladatelství, 2002), 245-259; for Slovakia see Robert Letz, “Perzekúcia proti
rímskokatolickej cirkvi na Slovensku v rokoch 1959-1963” [The Persecution of the Roman
Catholic Church in Slovakia in 1959-1963], Soudobé d jiny, 8, 2-3, (2001): 332-349; Jan PeÒek,
“Vlna politick ch procesov na Slovensku koncom 50 rokov” [The Wave of Political Trials in
Slovakia in the late 1950s], in Ji í Pernes and Jan Foitzik, eds., Politické procesy v ¢eskoslovensku
po roce 1945 a “p ípad Slánsk “ [Political Trials in Czechoslovakia after 1945, and the “Slansk
Case”] (Brno : Prius, 2005), 179-191. 
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StB intelligence that the churches (or the Catholic Church) represented the main
bastion of antistate activities. The party language was somewhat more euphemistic
than the StB documents, but it was clear enough. A 1957 resolution of the ÚV KS¢
Secretariat that served as an instruction for the lower bodies specifies quite clearly
that “the state‘s oversight over the activities of the church cannot be diminished;
instead, it must be intensified.”43 A year later the party leadership was even more
explicit: “Imperialism uses religion as one of the instruments of the Cold War to
carry out its counterrevolutionary plans.” The Catholic clergy were “professional
disseminators of obscurantism.”44 One thing reinforced another — the party
resolutions assured the StB that its attacks on Christians corresponded to the party
line; in the opposite direction, StB reports on the “detected” enemy activities by the
church were seen by the party leadership as proof that this was the correct line...
And of course, the StB had no doubts: “An analysis of the subversive activities of
the church shows that the Roman Catholic Church in this country, controlled by
enemy elements, has practically become the strongest antistate organization...”45
The case of the Catholic bishops, who, for the most part, were still imprisoned or
interned, shows how the rhetoric of the StB influenced the considerations of top
officials. In the spring of 1956 the KS¢ leadership was considering the release of
internees, although they were not to be given back their functions; the sentences of
some imprisoned bishops were suspended. It was a cautious gesture, not applying to
all of the unjustly imprisoned, nor to the interned Archbishop of Prague Josef Beran,
who was considered to be the main leader of clerical resistance against the regime.
Yet it was a minor progress. But in 1957, StB reports on the religious activities of
some of the released (they had remained under constant observation, with their place
of residence prescribed) led the regime to reconsider how to isolate them from the
population. In the spring of 1958 the KS¢ leadership decided to take decisive
measures. Bishop Jan VojtaÒÒák, over eighty years old, was rearrested and put back in
prison to serve the rest of his sentence of 1951 (24 years); other bishops were taken
into strict internment. There they either died, or remained until 1963. Their fate was
by no way exceptional. For example, the campaign against members of the
proscribed male religious orders46 launched in the mid-1950s continued claiming
victims until 1964. An estimated 400 monks went to prison (nearly 250 in Bohemia
and Moravia). As in previous cases, the crime that was actually being punished was
religious activity as such. The former routine accusations of espionage or similar
crimes were now seldom invoked. By this time, the investigators and judges found
the subversive or treasonous activities to include teaching of religion, secret worship,
43. Jan PeÒek, Michal Barnovsk , Pod kuratelou moci: Cirkvi na Slovensku v rokoch 1953-1970
[In the Custody of Power: The Churches in Slovakia 1953-1970] (Bratislava: Veda, 1999), 83.
44. Ibid., 104.
45. A MV ¢R, A 2/1, i.j. 301. 
46. Male religious orders were banned in Czechoslovakia in 1950, and their members were
interned or imprisoned for several years. After they were released, they were forbidden any
common activities, with the StB treating any attempt at coordinated activities as criminal.
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lectures on theology, listening to foreign radio, or reading foreign texts. The
sentences often reached the double digits; later complaints by the investigated
persons mention the use of psychological duress during interrogation, and distortion
of the affirmations made by the accused as well as witnesses. The trials of lay persons,
who usually worked behind the scenes of religious life, were similarly constructed: a
model example was the “liquidation” of secret groups that were inspired by the
Belgian-French movement Jeunesse ouvrière chrétienne (JOC). Their main activity
was an effort to bring Christian principles into everyday life and promote education in
theology and philosophy. At the beginning of the 1960s the StB cracked down, the
courts declaring these activities treasonous and subversive. In a model trial in Ostrava
in the spring of 1961, over twenty leaders were sentenced to terms ranging from 4 to
14 years, with a number of spin-off cases related to this one. 
However, a new category of “former persons” — the so-called “amnestants” —
 became the most remarkable group among the prosecuted. In the Czechoslovak
context this term did not appear until the end of the 1950s, as the first extensive
amnesty did not occur until May 1960. Officially, it was justified by the
15th anniversary of the liberation of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Army. On this
anniversary, the country was officially declared to have entered the era of Socialism.
This milestone of progress was announced by President Novotn  in June 1960. He
also declared that “only a few informers from the ranks of the former bourgeois
classes” were left standing “against the people,” therefore, an amnesty would cause
no great state security problem. However, Novotn ’s optimism in this regard was
entirely disingenuous, as illustrated by a series of measures designed to minimize the
direct impact of this amnesty on society. Three thousand political prisoners regarded
as the instigators of “antistate” activities were excluded from the amnesty. Those who
were amnestied were warned not to speak out in public or discuss their painful
experiences. However, these and other measures failed to satisfy the StB hardliners
who were convinced that the more than 5,500 released prisoners represented the seed
of a new, even more refined and subtle activity against the state. Extensive new
measures (recruitment of agents among the released, social discrimination, etc.)
culminated in the thorough classification of these people as “former persons,” the
majority of whom fell under the category of “amnestants.” These people were singled
out by Interior Ministry officials for priority attention, on the assumption that their
future crimes would be all the more highly conspirational and dangerous. In the
twisted logic of the StB, it was the imprisonment which had given the conspirators the
opportunity to inspire one another and create tightly linked networks. The cynicism
of this approach reached an extreme in the case of one such artificially created group
in 1961. The prosecutor then charged and the court convicted a group of amnestied
prisoners on the basis of an accusation that “until early May 1960 in the Prague
4 district, out of hatred toward the people’s democratic system and in mutual
complicity and in complicity with other co-conspirators, they conducted constant
propaganda before other persons...” The Prague 4 district actually meant the Pankrác
prison, where the prisoners were being held at the time of the alleged crime.




release.47 The StB devoted maximum effort to monitoring the released individuals,
with the specific purpose of promptly putting on at least a few show trials that might
serve as a warning, not only for the amnestants, but for the party leadership as well. In
January 1961, one of the deputy ministers of Interior boasted that under the operation
“Amnestant,” 90 percent of those amnestied were under control. Regional reports
show that the regional departments of the ministry were aware of their superiors’ keen
interest in the matter.48 The total extent of the trials of amnestied prisoners is still not
known, but even conservative estimates speak about hundreds of prosecutions and
subsequent convictions with at least short-term sentences. The relatively short
sentences cannot be identified with a liberalization of the courts and the StB: in fact,
they were simply easier to prove than any broader “criminal activity.” An amnesty
was officially considered a mere “interruption” of sentence, which was suspended
provided that, usually for ten years, no other conviction for a “premeditated criminal
act” came up. The length of the new sentence was no longer important, for as
amnestied persons who had “abused the privilege of amnesty,” they were made to
serve out the rest of their draconian sentences left over from the 1950s.49 The StB
investigators were actually well aware of the powerful tools they possessed for
dealing with accused persons and witnesses. Deputy Interior Minister Kotál summed
it up concisely — why go to the trouble of developing a new sedition case “when they
can just be sent back to serve the rest of their sentences”?50 Nor was the nominal
length of the sentences in any way short: in a number of cases severity of the sentence
was comparable to that of the Stalin era.51
In short, the early 1960s did not represent a decisive turning point in terms of
political trials or the eagerness of the StB to exert control over the widest possible
segment of society. The second amnesty of political prisoners in May 1962 was
accompanied by similar measures to intimidate those released. Nor did the tendency
to assume that antistate activities were endemic to the circles of the “class enemy”
disappear when Lubomír ∑trougal took office as Minister of Interior52: religious
activity was still being regarded as criminal in the mid-1960s. It is clear that the
47. See Cuhra, “Politické procesy s v ícími…,” 252-253.
48. A MV ¢R, A 2/2, i.j. 1181. As the Prague regional department of the Ministry of Interior
proudly declared less than six months after the amnesty, out of 900 cases “[...] 18 persons have
already been [...] taken back into custody.” A MV ¢R, A 9, i.j. 79.
49. Cases in which people sentenced to one or two years ended up serving ten or more were not
uncommon. 
50. A MV ¢R, A 2/2, i.j. 1181.
51. For example, the case of Vladimír Daniel, formerly a social democratic functionary, convicted
for alleged involvement in the so-called Christian Democratic Party in 1961. There were 9 years
remaining on his old sentence; the new one was for 12 more. See Cuhra, P íb h procesu…
52. Interior Minister R. Barák was removed from office in June 1961; in April 1962 he was
convicted of sabotage and theft, and sentenced to 15 years. This was no punishment for crimes
committed in his office, but a result of vendettas among top party officials. After ∑trougal took
office, the activities of the ministry changed only gradually; for example, the directive on
“former persons” was not revoked until 1964, only to be replaced by the files kept on so-called
“enemy persons.” Most of the previously gathered materials remained available to the
respective departments of the StB, which were making efforts to continue the surveillance.
Koudelka, Státní bezpe©nost…, 93-95.
©e©r
©r ©e
IN THE SHADOW OF LIBERALIZATION 425
political trials and subsequent persecution wound down only gradually. In the amnesty
of May 1965 another 170 political prisoners were released; only a year earlier, the
KS¢ leadership had been informed that there were 134 Roman Catholic clerics in
prison.53 In early 1968 (!) there were still nearly 700 people in Czechoslovak prisons
serving time for “antistate” activities, among them Roman Catholic bishops Ján
Korec and Dominik Kalata.54 Most of those released continued to live under the
threat of having to serve out the rest of their old sentences and having new ones
imposed. This threat had an understandable impact on their further social involvement. 
Analogous was the failure of the second attempt to bring the show trials up for
revision, which was again limited to the cases of party functionaries only. In 1962-
1963, the new commissions (the “Kolder” and “barnabite” commissions) led to the
revocation of sentences in the well-known cases of Slánsk  or Husák, but completely
ignored the cases of non-communists imprisoned during the Stalin era, let alone the
people sentenced during the second half of the 1950s. The question of — political or
legal — responsibility for the trials was more or less not even raised at the time.
Ironically, a tiny dent in the wall of silence in Czechoslovakia was made only after the
fall of Khrushchev, when the courts handled complaints filed by some convicted
persons in the late 1960s; a rehabilitation was granted a few in isolated instances. But
even that could not undermine the basic taboo: the chapter was closed, related matters
not open to question, and a financial compensation mostly out of the question. The
High Court bluntly acknowledged this approach in 1965 in its instruction on the
property claims by former “kulaks”: the law had been broken frequently, it said, but
“the revocation of sentence would also revoke the confiscation of property, and it
would be necessary to return the property to the convicted persons.” However, a
restitution of property “would unquestionably face public opposition and
unfavourable criticism.” Therefore, a meeting of the respective ÚV KS¢ departments
decided that “for these reasons, there will be no revision of the agricultural cases.”55
The chain of injustice had come full circle, with no hope of redemption. 
If we consider the facts about the degree of repression and violence still existing
in the first half of the 1960s, it becomes difficult to stick to the interpretation that
during this period “mass terror came to a halt, and the omnipotence and impunity of
the Security was trimmed back through reorganization.”56 On the contrary, all that
53. NA, fond ÚV KS¢ — p edsednictvo, sv. 54, a.j. 57; also sv. 117, a.j. 122. The authors of
the report probably included members of the orders and students of theology in their definition
of the clergy.
54. Róbert Letz, “Justícia — ‘slúÂka komunistickej moci’” [The Judiciary — “the Servant of
the Communist Power”], in ∑truktúry moci na Slovensku 1948-1989 [Power Structures in
Slovakia 1948-1989] (PreÒov: Vydavatel’stvo Michala VaÒka, 2004), 426. The reasons for their
conviction and the proportions of the sentences are not known, in any case there were at least 20
clergy members sentenced at the beginning of the 1960s among them. NA, fond Sekretariát pro
v ci církevní MK ¢SR (SPVC MK ¢SR), carton 19. 
55. See ∑árka Rokosová, “Administrativní opat ení — jedna z forem perzekuce sedláků
komunistick m reÂimem” [Administrative Measures as a Form of Persecution of Farmers by
the Communist Regime], Securitas imperii, 10 (2003): 147-194.








can be said is that the regime no longer chose to present its repression and judicial
persecution in spectacular show trials; and also that membership in the Communist
Party could sometimes provide space for the utterance of critical opinions. Over time
this space spread and diminished: critics did not always escape punishment, and
there were also attempts to stop the internal party criticism completely. The
measures applied, however, were much more lenient than those taken toward
majority society, as illustrated by the “punishments” meted out in a number of the
larger intra-party cases. Expulsion, party reprimands, or removal from function and
employment are punishments on a different level than the judicial persecution of the
trials described above.57 One example for all: the case of Party members Jind ich
PuÒ and Jaroslav Jindra, who were sentenced in 1965 to suspended sentences for
criticizing the party leadership and debating the need to solve the situation “by force
if necessary.” Meanwhile, six months earlier, “ criticism of political conditions” had
earned clergyman Alfons ¢evela six years in prison.58 For ¢evela, the mere presence
of his relatives at the trial, or the unwillingness of the prosecutor to “try to highlight
my case somehow,” were simply out of the question.59 It was this application of a
double standard in applying repressive measures that served to give credence to the
illusion of a quickly advancing liberalization in Czechoslovakia. In the words of Petr
Pithart, “they were living in a permanent illusion that they are the vanguard of
society; this is why they seem to have such clean consciences.”60 The after-effects of
this illusion are still palpable today. 
The darker picture of events in Czechoslovakia during this period as outlined
here is naturally only one aspect of the multilayered historical picture that is to be
sought if we wish to understand the social life and the population’s attitude toward
the 1968 reform. The publication of Solzhenitsyn’s One Day in the Life of Ivan
Denisovich in 1963 did little to change the fortunes of many political prisoners.
Their stories, too, belong to Czechoslovak history, at least as much as the struggles
and failures of the “liberals” both within and without the Party. One cannot grasp
the Prague Spring without first understanding Czechoslovak society in the 1960s,
its “worries” and attitudes to the regime. With a deeper knowledge of the society in
the first two decades of the communist rule, the historical explication of the Prague
Spring would not tend to be limited to descriptions of internal party struggles.
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57. Especially illustrative are the cases of the “detected” groups at universities, which mostly
ended up in party discipline only. One of the biggest cases (the “antistate” group of Klement
LukeÒ in 1961, supposedly linked to Yugoslavia), despite the best efforts of the StB, also
resulted merely in expulsion from the party or party reprimands. See Kaplan: Ko eny
©eskoslovenské reformy…, IV, 173-175.
58. Vl©ek, Perzekuce muÂsk ch ádů a kongregací…, 237.
59. Information on the prosecution of Jind ich PuÒ and Jaroslav Jindra, a copy in the archives of
the author. 
60. Petr Pithart, OsmaÒedesát  [Nineteen sixty-eight] (Praha: Rozmluvy, 1990), 38.
©r
©r
źy ©r
©r
źy
